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PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE-1956 TENNESSEE SURVEY
EDMUND M. MORGAN*
PLEADING

Generally: To one who has not inherited the Tennessee system of
procedure and has not yet "first endured, then pitied, then embraced"
it, it presents some startling contrasts. There is an astounding intermingling of the modern, which seeks to make procedure the servant
of substance, with the ancient, that has in most jurisdictions been
relegated to the legal attic or to a museum of procedural antiques. In
an action instituted by warrant in the Court of General Sessions of
Shelby County and tried de novo on appeal in the circuit court, the
warrant is a summons and cannot serve as a pleading although it must
allege a cause of action. The pleadings are oral; and the recital in
the warrant of the contents of a note with profert of the note, and
the phygical insertion of the note in the record do not, in the absence
of a bill of exceptions, enable the court of appeals to "consider"
the note. To make it a part of the formal record, the process of oyer
is necessary. The consequence of applying this outmoded doctrine
of common-law pleading in conjunction with the accepted rules
governing bills of exceptions was that the court was unable to deal
with the real issue, and had to indulge in presumptions as to unrecorded amendments and unspecified evidence to sustain the decision
of the circuit court.1
The common-law rule that pleadings are to be construed most
strongly against the pleader has been abrogated. Now every reasonable
intendment is to be made in favor of the pleading. Thus, a complaint
in intervention which alleges in one count facts which support the
intervenor insurance company's right, both under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and under its policy, to be reimbursed for sums
paid out by it for compensation and for medical and hospital aid, is
sufficient to authorize recovery for sums paid for such aid in excess
of the amount stipulated in the act.2 But we have been instructed
that when a plaintiff has been injured by conduct of a defendant
which constitutes both common-law negligence and a violation of a
statute, he should state his claim based on the former in one count
* Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Royall Professor
of Law Emeritus and former Acting Dean, Harvard Law School; Reporter,
A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence; member, Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; co-editor, Morgan and Maguire, Cases
and Materialson Evidence (3rd. ed. 1951); author, Basic Problems of Evidence
(1954).
1. Van Pelt v. P. and L. Federal Credit Union, 282 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1955).
2. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Elam, 278 S.W.2d 693 (Tenn.
1955).
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and that based on the latter in a separate count. This is particularly
true where the statute is the so-called Statutory Precautions Act,
which modifies the common-law obligations concerning precautions
to be taken at grade crossings at which warning signs are posted.
It is frequently said that a person injured at such a crossing has two
distinct causes of action. 3 What is meant is that he has distinct
grounds of recovery for the same infringement of his right to be
free from harm to his person wrongfully inflicted. Doubtless clarity
is increased by stating the common-law and statutory grounds in
separate paragraphs, for the extent of defendant's obligations and the
availability of defenses in justification or excuse under the statute are
different from those under the common law. But it is suggested
that no good purpose can be served by treating a separate ground
of recovery as a separate cause of action. This common-law practice grew out of the common-law rule which permitted the plaintiff
in one declaration to join as many causes of action in the same form
of action as he had against the same defendant. When the courts
began to insist that plaintiff should state only such facts as constituted a single ground of recovery and must support that statement
by proof, pleaders sought to take advantage of the established practice permitting the plaintiff to join in a single action all claims which
he had against the defendant that were remediable in the same form
of action. The pleader pretended, and so alleged, that each statement
of a ground of recovery was a statement of a completely different
cause. 4 The English courts tolerated this pretense until 1834, when
it was forbidden by the Hilary Rules. It would be unfortunate to
have such a fiction not only encouraged but made mandatory in
Tennessee more than a century after it was abolished in the jurisdiction of its origin.
Demurrer-PleadingConditions: The well settled rule that a complaint which fails to allege compliance with conditions precedent to
the creation of plaintiff's right to recover was applied in two interesting cases. Plaintiffs, seeking a mandatory injunction to compel a
telephone company to extend its services to a designated community
and to recover a penalty for thus discriminating against them as members of the community, failed to allege in their complaint application
to and adverse action by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission.
It was held insufficient on demurrer. The general rule was applied
which requires exhaustion of remedies before a properly constituted
administrative tribunal as a condition precedent to the right of judicial

3. Little v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 281 S.W.2d 284 (Tenn. App. W.S.

1954).

4. See MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF LITIGATION, C. I

(1956).
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relief.5 In Langford v. Vanderbilt University6 plaintiff was suing for
punitive damages for a libel without having given the defendant the
statutory five days notice affording it an opportunity to avoid the imposition of punitive damages; defendant demurred for failure to
allege performance of the statutory requirement. The trial court refused to include in the record plaintiff's exceptions concerning the
constitutionality of the statute. The supreme court ruled that no
bill of exceptions was necessary to preserve this problem for review
because the demurrer raised the question of constitutionality of the
statute.
In Denny v. Wilson County7 the extent to which a defense disclosed
in a complaint and not met by an anticipatory reply will make it demurrable was not discussed, but a recital of facts therein showing
estoppel by deed was held fatal. The court thought it worthwhile to
point out that such an estoppel was not required to be specially
pleaded in an action at law as distinguished from an action in
8
chancery.
Theory of Pleading-Variance:The decision in Teague v. Pritchardo
can be explained on two grounds. In a pleading, which if accurately
reported is remarkable for alleging not the existence of facts, but
that "plaintiff would show" the facts alleged, plaintiff averred (1)
negligence of defendant and his servants in leaving defendant's
automobile with its doors unlocked and its ignition key in place,
parked on a public street in a neighborhood where and at a time when
it was likely to be stolen, and (2) injury to plaintiff resulting from
negligent driving of the automobile by a person who did steal it. To
avoid the direction of a verdict upon proof of these facts, plaintiff
could not rely upon the statutory presumption based on proof of
registration and ownership of the automobile by defendant, that it
was being operated by defendant or by his servant in the course
of his employment. Obviously this would involve a shift in the theory
of his pleading as well as a complete variance from his theory of trial.
Furthermore, his own evidence rebutted the presumption.
Plea in Abatement: The few cases dealing with the pleading of
dilatory matters hardly deserve mention. A plea in abatement should
be promptly filed, but a chancellor may properly permit it to be filed
late or may consider a late plea though filed without previous leave. 10
A plea in abatement is necessary to attack an indictment, fair on its
face, for the alleged reason that the private acts pursuant to which
the grand jurors were selected are invalid. It must allege all the
5. Breeden v. Southern Bell Tel. &Tel. Co., 285 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. 1955).
7. 281 S.W.2d 671 (Tenn. 1955).
8. Id. at 675.
6. 287 S.W.2d 32 (Tenn. 1956).,

9. 279

S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).

10. Alexander v. Alexander, 286 S.W.2d 104 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
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pertinent facts. A motion to quash the indictment is inappropriate."
Pleas in Bar: In view of the provisions for concurrent jurisdiction
of the chancery and the courts of, law in so many subjects, it is
somewhat strange that there is no statute or ruling authorizing
equitable defenses in legal actions. Ejectment is a strictly legal
action in which no purely equitable defense may be pleaded.' 2 Other
decisions as to pleas are orthodox. For example, the defense that a
breach of warranty of an article was waived by the plaintiff purchaser's further use of the warranted article must be pleaded spe13
cially.
Amendments: Tennessee applies the accepted rule that the trial
judge's ruling on a motion to amend a pleading will be reversed only
for abuse of discretion. Generally, amendments are freely allowed
and technical objections brushed aside. Thus, where on petition filed
in a county court, a will contest was removed to the appropriate circuit court, an amendment to the petition was properly permitted in
the latter. It would have been a useless ceremony, involving needless
expense and waste of time, to send the matter back to the county
court. 14 And it was entirely proper to add, by amendment to the
parties to a bill of review, a person who was not a party to the original
suit in which a decree pro confesso was entered.15 On the other hand,
there is a great reluctance to grant the right to add what the judge
considers an unconscionable defense, and unless the motion to amend
is made promptly, it will ordinarily be denied. Hence, when defendant
moved to amend by alleging expiration of the statutory period of
limitations, (1) his failure to plead this when earlier ordered to set
out his defenses specially, and (2) his delay in making the motion
until after his motion for a directed verdict had been denied and
plaintiff had been compelled to elect between two counts made
denial of the motion eminently proper. 6 And where the proposed
amendment would serve no beneficial purpose, it is properly rejected. Such was the situation where in a quo warranto proceeding
to determine the validity of the appointment of two members of a
school board, the proposed amendment questioned the eligibility of
the two to hold over after the expiration of the term for which they
were properly appointed, since no party to the record was seeking the
1
office held by either or appeared to be rightfully entitled to it.
Where the amendment introduces no new cause of action, it relates
back to the time of the original pleading, even though the statutory
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Price v. State, 287 S.W.2d 14 (Tenn. 1956).
Harris v. Buchignani, 285 S.W.2d 108 (Tenn. 1955).
Huddleston v. Lee, 284 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
Needham v. Doyle, 286 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
White v. Henry, 285 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tenn. 1955).
Caccamisi v. Thurmond, 282 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954)
State ex rel., etc. v. Simpson, 281 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1955)
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period of limitations applicable to the cause stated has expired.
Thus, where plaintiff named the defendant as Southeastern Greyhound Lines and process was served upon a proper officer of the
Greyhound Corporation, an amendment substituting the Greyhound
Corporation as defendant, after it was shown that the Southeastern
Greyhound Lines was not a legal entity but was merely the name
of an operating division of Greyhound Corporation, did not bring in
a new party or state a new cause of action, but merely corrected a misnomer. The trial judge committed reversible error in ruling that
the amendment did not relate back. 18
Parties-Capacity:A person who has been adjudged insane' may
sue and be sued in his own name if the adverse party fails to object;
but by the majority rule such a person is incapable of maintaining an
action for divorce, and a decree rendered therein is absolutely void.
The reasons given are that such a person is incapable of the requisite
personal volition and has no capacity to take the prescribed oath.
These reasons have no applicability in some circumstances and the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, therefore, overruled former decisions
and adopted the minority view, which makes the decree merely
voidable. Hence, where the decree is valid on its face, it is not subject to collateral attack. 19
In deciding that a foreign corporation doing a purely interstate
business in Tennessee has capacity to sue and defend in Tennessee
courts, though it is not licensed to do business within the state, the
supreme court applied a well-settled rule.20
Same-Necessary: Where plaintiff took a nonsuit as to two of three
joint tortfeasor defendants, they were no longer parties to the action, and the trial court had no power to determine their rights as
against the remaining defendant. 21
REMEDIES

Generally: Where a statute imposes a new duty or creates a
new right and provides the penalty or remedy for its violation
or infringement, the court has no power to award additional remedies.
Thus, the statutory requirement, that the operator and owner of a
motor vehicle involved in an accident causing damage show financial
responsibility in order to avoid forfeiture of license and number
plates, is exclusive. A court has no authority to enjoin the owner or
operator from conveying or encumbering his property until he has
paid a judgment secured against him for injuries caused by the accident.22 And where no penalty or remedy is provided for violation by
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Link v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 279 S.W.2d 259 (Tenn. 1955).
Turner v. Bell, 279 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1955).
Seagram Distillers Co. v. Corenswet, 281 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. 1955).
Mink v. Majors, 279 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
Turner v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. 1955).
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a member of the Beer Committee of Knox County of a resolution of

the county court governing applications for license, the sole remedy
lies in action by the court, and protesting citizens have no right to
present or cross-examine witnesses or to be otherwise heard by the
Board concerning the granting of such an application.2
Attachment: In a divorce action, which is a "chancery suit," the

court has jurisdiction to grant an attachment upon grounds other
than those specified in the code that are applicable both at law and
in chancery. But the grant must be made upon allegation and prayer,
and an attachment granted upon non-statutory grounds without such
allegation and prayer must be dissolved. 24
Habeas Corpus: The court has had three occasions to consider the
scope of inquiry suitable in a petition by one held for extradition. In
the second, the petitioner was to be delivered to the authorities of the
State of Florida because of alleged violation of his parole. He alleged
that his conviction in Florida was in violation of the 14th Amendment
for failure to appoint counsel for him as an indigent defendant.
Chief Justice Neil, speaking for the court, said: "The determinative
issue in this case involves the jurisdiction of the courts of Tennessee
to decide the constitutionality of a statute of the State of Florida under
which the relator was tried and convicted." Conceding that the refusal to appoint counsel was a violation of due process and that a void
judgment is subject to collateral attack, he denied relator's right to
question its validity, or to contend that the Florida court would not
grant him the same relief which he was asking of the Tennessee
court. He concluded: "Moreover, we think it would be a dangerous
precedent to permit one who is a fugitive from justice to invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts of this State to review and declare unconstitutional a statute of a demanding state under which he stands
convicted. It would be disrespectful to the honor and dignity of a
sovereign state. The demanding state must be the judge of its own
laws as well as the proceedings for their enforcement, and the jurisdiction of its courts are exclusive in determining if a person is
being deprived of his liberty without due process of law."2 5 This result does not indicate a lack of judicial power but a determination of
judicial policy.
The court had previously held that it would not consider alleged
defects in the indictment of the demanding state so long as it substantially charged an offense, 26 and it later ruled that an indictment
which charged that "the offense was committed in the fall of 1949"
was not on that account open to attack. It conceded that the relator
23.
24.
25.
26.

Manuel v. Eckel, 285 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1955).
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 281 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
State ex rel. Johnson v. Llewelyn, 286 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. 1955).
State ex rel. Sandford v. Cate, 285 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. 1955).
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might show that he was not subject to extradition because not in
the demanding state at the time the offense was committed; but he
must show it beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, if he was ordered
discharged solely because the alleged defect in the indictment prevented or made very difficult such a showing, the order must be
27
reversed on appeal by the sheriff.
Mandamus: Mandamus to compel restoration to a position or
office in the classified civil service of the City of Nashville by
relator who was laid off by the Director of Personnel will not
issue unless relator has exhausted his administrative remedies or
shows that request to the proper administrative authorities for relief would have been futile. The relator failed to make this showing
by offering to prove that there was no lawfully appointed person in
his department entitled to give relator notice of layoff and that the
Director of Personnel had no such authority. He should have appealed to the Commission and made a record there. This is a condition precedent of the right of a civil service employee to maintain in
a court of record any proceeding in the nature of an appeal from a
28
decision of a city official involving his civil service status.
Scire Facias: Under Tennessee practice scire facias to revive a
judgment of the court of appeals is a judicial writ to enforce the
judgment and is a continuation of the original action. As such, the
court has jurisdiction to determine all questions of law and fact
raised by extensive pleadings in the scire facias proceeding and is
not confined to issues made by the writ and the plea or answer thereto.2

Declaratory Judgment: In an interesting case involving the jurisdiction of the State Board of Claims, the supreme court declared that
the Tennessee Declaratory Judgment Act does not give the courts
jurisdiction over any controversy that would not be within their
jurisdiction if affirmative relief were being sought. Actions for injuries to person or property cannot be maintained against the state
except where the state has consented. The State Board of Claims is
given exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and allow claims for injuries and damage caused by negligence of state officials or employees
in certain specified situations and no other. The Board dismissed a
claim of complainant for damages for wrongful death caused by
negligent conduct of a convict who was negligently permitted to drive
a state owned truck outside the prison grounds. Complainant sought a
declaratory judgment that the Board had jurisdiction to hear and
determine and award compensation to complainant. The chancellor
27. Reeves v. State ex reL. Thompson, 288 S.W.2d 451 (Tenn. 1956).
28. State ex rel. Jones v. Nashville, 279 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. 1955); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 27-914 (1956).
29. Craddock v. Calcutt, 285 S.W.2d 528 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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sustained a demurrer to the bill of complaint and the supreme court

affirmed. Obviously the court below, whether chancery or circuit,
would have had no jurisdiction of an action for wrongful death against
the state. But does it follow that it would have no jurisdiction to
determine whether the Board had jurisdiction? Or is the decision to

be justified on the ground that the act does not give the court jurisdiction to construe statutes, or that the courts will, in the exercise

of their discretion, refuse to determine the jurisdiction of boards, commissions or inferior courts? The opinion seems to rely upon all three

grounds.

30

Election of Remedies: Where a complainant brought a bill to review a decree pro confesso on the ground that the order for the decree
was obtained by fraud and judgment was entered against him, the
complainant was not barred from maintaining another bill on the
ground of errors on the face of the record. The two bills were not
inconsistent and complainant had not, by bringing the first bill,
31
made an irrevocable election of remedies.
PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

Generally:An examination of current English, Canadian and American law reports makes it abundantly clear that the courts, including
those of Tennessee, frequently, if not generally, use the term burden of
proof indiscriminately to denote (a) the burden of producing sufficient
evidence to justify a finding and (b) the burden of persuading the
trier of fact to make the finding. As Wigmore has pointed out, the
former is more accurately described as the risk of non-production
of the evidence and the latter as the risk of non-persuasion of the
trier, for the source of the production or persuasion is immaterial.
The evidence may be introduced by the burden-bearer or by his opponent or by the judge. The persuading factor may be found in the
evidence, or in the argument of either counsel, or in the charge of
the judge. A presumption, as distinguished from an inference, is an
assumption of fact which is required when a specified fact or group
of facts is established in an action. This fact or group of facts may
conveniently be called the basic fact and the fact assumed may be
called the presumed fact.
Basic Fact of Presumption: Two recent cases demonstrate the importance of accurate definition of the basic fact. It is well settled in
Tennessee that in a will contest the contestant has the burden of
persuasion on the issue of undue influence, and that the existence of
a confidential relationship between the testator and the chief beneficiary is relevant. But the existence of that relationship alone is
30. Hill v. Beeler, 286 S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. 1956).

31. White v. Henry, 285 S.W.2d 353 (Tenn. 1955).
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not sufficient to create a presumption of undue influence in the absence of any activity of the beneficiary in the preparation or execution of the will.32 In some jurisdictions this presumption fixes not only

the burden of producing evidence but also the burden of persuasion.
And the opinion in this case seems to assume that such is its effect
in Tennessee. In Wilson v. St. Louis Terminal Dist. Co. 33 the court
speaks in terms of inference, presumption and prima facie case. If
there is a presumption that an employee found dead at his post of
duty met his death from an injury or accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment, the basic fact must include physical
exertion by him. The mere fact that he was found dead at his place
of employment during working hours is not enough. In this case, the
result would be the same whether the court was dealing with a presumption or an inference; and it seems reasonably clear that its
decision was merely that there was no evidence from which the trier
could find the required fact, that the injury arose in the course of his
employment.
In Reynolds v. State4 a similar uncertainty appears. The court, dealing with the fact that deceased was found dead in Wilson County
from a broken neck, said: "We think that there must be a presumption that the crime was committed here, rebuttable in character,
that the crime was committed where the body was found, when there
is no showing to the contrary." It then states other circumstances supporting the presumption and concludes that the jury was warranted
in finding that the victim was murdered in Wilson County.
Statutory Presumption:By Tennessee Code section 59-1038, ownership and registration of an automobile in defendant's name creates
a "presumption and prima facie case" that its operator on a particular occasion was defendant or defendant's agent operating it for
his use. This is not so far overcome as to call for a directed verdict
by the introduction of evidence to the contrary of such a character
that the jury might properly reject or disbelieve it.35 But it is overcome by plaintiff's own evidence that the operator of the car was a
thief or other unauthorized person who took it when parked with the
ignition key in place. 36
Conflicting Presumptions:The presumption that separation of jurors
in a criminal case is prejudicial and vitiates their verdict conflicts with
the presumption that the officer in charge of the separated juror during the separation observed his oath and did not communicate with
the juror concerning the case or allow others to do so. The latter pre32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Halle v. Summerfield, 287 S.W.2d 57 (Tenn. 1956).
278 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. 1955).
287 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1956).
McParland v. Pruitt,284 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
Teague v. Pritchard, 279 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).

1956 ]

PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE

1059

sumption is of greater strength and prevails. This pronouncement was

unnecessary in the case at bar for the juror was the only woman member and Chapter 71 of the Public Acts of 1951 specifically provides that
segregation of women from men jurors outside the court room is not
37
unlawful.
Burden of Proof-Shifting: In Anderson v. Nichols,3 an action to
avoid a deed of decedent on the ground of fraud, the chancellor held
that evidence of matters which "constitute a badge of fraud" and
casts suspicion upon the bona fides of the grantee defendant puts
upon him the burden of proving bona fides. As the court said, the
burden of proving bona fides of the transaction was shifted to the
defendant. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the
court was speaking of the burden of producing evidence or the burden
of persuasion.
Burden of Proof-Measure of Persuasion:In a criminal prosecution
the rule that the state must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt
has no application to the issue of venue, which is a jurisdictional matter. The measure of persuasion is that applicable to an ordinary civil
action, usually expressed as proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 39 And the same is true upon the issue of revocation of a suspension of sentence. It is said that the judge may determine that
defendant's conduct justifies revocation of sentence even though the
evidence be weak.4°
Same-On CriminalAppeal: In Tennessee the usual rule, which cannot be said to be usual in other jurisdictions, that the accused on
appeal has the burden of persuading the court that the evidence preponderates against the verdict, assumes that in a homicide case the
state has introduced evidence from which the jury could reasonably
find that defendant's conduct was the cause of the death alleged in the
41
indictment. Otherwise the accused has no such burden.
EWDENCE
Relevance-Customary Conduct: Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any fact in issue. The immediate
fact which it tends to prove may be merely the basis for an inference
or series of inferences to the ultimate fact in issue. The customary conduct of persons engaged in a particular business or activity may
not coincide with the standard of conduct which the law requires;
that is, it may not constitute due care. For this reason, some courts
have held that evidence of such customary conduct is inadmissible to
37. Steadman v. State, 282 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1955).
38. 286 S.W.2d 96 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
39. Reynolds v. State, 287 S.W.2d 15 (Tenn. 1956).

40. Thompson v. State, 279 S.W.2d 261 (Tenn. 1955).

41. Seagroves v. State, 281 S.W.2d 644 (Tenn. 1955).
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rebut an adverse party's claim of negligence. This disregards the
fact that what men customarily do in a particular occupation or calling
is very likely to be what the ordinarily prudent person would do
in the same circumstances, and is therefore relevant as tending to
prove due care, though it does not necessarily constitute due care.
Thus, in a recent case where a subcontractor had removed guards
erected by others to protect the public from excavations, in order
that he might gain access for his work, the court of appeals held
that evidence of the custom in that activity for the subcontractor to
replace the guards or to construct new ones was admissible as tending
to prove the conduct of reasonable men in the same circumstances.4
Same-Other Crimes: The usual statement concerning admissibility
of evidence of other crimes or civil wrongs as tending to prove the
commission of the crime or wrong in issue calls for its exclusion except in specified circumstances. It is believed that both the American
Law Institute Model Code, rule 311, and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, rule 55, make the proper analysis. Evidence of a person's
character as tending to prove his conduct on a particular occasion is
generally rejected because of its slight weight and unduly prejudicial effect; so when the crime or wrong is relevant only as a basis
for an inference to disposition and thence to conduct in accord therewith, the evidence of the crime or wrong is necessarily excluded.
But where relevant as tending to prove any other material fact, the
evidence is admissible. The specific instances are merely examples
and not all inclusive. Uniform rule 55 so declares, enumerating "absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity." The Tennessee courts have used
the ordinary generalization, but a recent case would have been much
more easily explained by the doctrine of rule 55. The defendant was
on trial for stealing and for receiving stolen goods, a suit of clothes
belonging to Levy Brothers in Nashville. The suit was found in an
automobile for which he had the parking check, with other new suits
including four stolen from a Mr. Daniels in Memphis. Evidence that
the suits, among which the Levy Brothers suit was found, had been
stolen from Mr. Daniels was held admissible. The court discussed the
authorities which stated and applied the so-called exceptions but did
not specify the one applicable in this situation. 43
Photographs:The first requisite of admissibility of a photograph is
that what it purports to picture be relevant; the second that it be
verified as a substantially accurate representation of the relevant
place, thing or person so pictured. Ordinarily the physical characteristics of the place where a relevant event occurred are of importance,
42. De Ark v. Nashville Stone Setting Corp., 279 S.W.2d 518 (Tenn. App.
M.S. 1955).
43. Lia'as v. State, 286 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn. 1956).
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and a properly verified photograph of the place is admissible, provided
that there has been no substantial change in those characteristics
which have a material bearing upon the issue, or where the change,
if any, can be so explained as to make the photograph helpful rather
than misleading. It is generally a function of the trial judge to make
this determination. Thus, in a recent case a photograph of a railway
crossing introduced by plaintiff pictured it with the shrubbery grown
as at the time of year when the accident occurred, and a photograph
introduced by the defendant pictured it in the winter time without
shrubbery; the court of appeals held that the reception of the latter
did not constitute error.44 And where the physical condition of the
defendant at the time he made a confession was deemed relevant, the
trial judge committed no error in admitting a photograph of him
45
taken on the same day.
Same-Hearsay: See discussion infra, re hearsay admitted without
objection.
Irregularly Secured: Evidence obtained irregularly but not in violation of a statute is not on that account inadmissible. Thus, where
a trial judge ordered the exhumation of the body of the man for
whose homicide defendant was on trial, without any notice to defendant, by an informal order not noted on the minutes, testimony
as to the result of the examination of the body highly unfavorable to
defendant was properly admitted.48
Hearsay-Relevance and Weight: Is hearsay evidence which does
not fall within any recognized exception deemed irrelevant or deemed
ol: such slight weight that it must be disregarded when admitted without objection? The great weight of modern authority declares that
such evidence is to be given its inherent probative value. This seems
to be the view sanctioned by the majority of the court in Sturgis v.
State,47 but in most instances the court is at pains to point out other
reasons which prevent objection, such as the establishment of the
fact in question by other evidence. 48 In the Sturgis case, Mr. Justice
Burnett, speaking for the majority, relates a number of statements
previously made by the defendant and says: "Since they were made
by him and not objected to they are competent and must be given
their natural probative effect as if in law they were admissible." 49
(It is difficult to imagine any ground on which the defendant could
have objected, for nothing is better settled than that admissions by
a party are receivable in evidence against him for the truth of the

44. Little v. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry., 281 S.W.2d 284 (Tenn. App. W.S.

1954).

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Kirkendoll v. State, 281 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1955).
Dennis v. State, 279 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1955).
288 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1956).
Hale v. State, 281 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1955).
288 S.W.2d at 437.
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matter stated.) The learned justice then considers other evidence,
obviously objectionable as hearsay, corroborative of testimony of the
complainant: "In addition to the above enumerated acts of corroboration are the statements made by the detective who testifies without
objection as to how the young lady related this transaction to himas to how these things happened on these different occasions. Such
statements of the detective are admissible as corroborative of her
testimony."50 Chief Justice Neil, speaking for himself and Mr. Justice
Tomlinson, could find no corroboration: "The testimony of the police
officers as to statements made to them by her regarding her alleged
relations with the defendant, not made in the presence of the accused
are not corroborative of the girl. It is not insisted that the statements
made by her to these officers were part of the res gestae. In fact, they
were not."51
Hearsay Rule-Applicability in Contempt Proceeding: A proceeding to punish defendant for contempt of court in conspiring with his
wife to obtain fraudulently a divorce by falsely alleging residence in
Memphis is "neither a civil action nor a criminal prosecution as ordinarily understood nor a criminal prosecution within the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution."5 2 Affidavits are usually
admissible. After making these pronouncements, the court said that defendant must be given the freest opportunity to present his defense,
and that if inadmissible evidence is received, the appellate court
will reject it and decide the case as if it were not in the record. The
chancellor at the hearing had received the transcript of testimony of
the wife given at a previous time when neither the defendant nor his
attorney was present. She did not testify at the hearing but was present, and the chancellor then and there gave defendant leave to examine her under oath if he so desired.
The supreme court declared (a) that the chancellor was fully
justified in considering the former testimony "as a basis for the
show cause order," (b) that the record, excluding this testimony, sustained the chancellor's finding, (c) that the chancellor's offer to put
the witness on the stand and permit defendant to cross-examine her
satisfied the requirement of confrontation, and (d) that there was "no
doubt under the proof" of the conspiracy.53 The result is clear, but
just what does the case stand for upon the applicability of the exclusionary rules of evidence at a hearing upon an order to show cause
why a defendant should not be punished for criminal contempt? Does
it hold anything more than that if non-admissible evidence is received, the appellate court on review will disregard it even though
50. Ibid.

51. 288 S.W.2d at 438.
52. Bowdon v. Bowdon, 278 S.W.2d 670 (Tenn. 1955).
53. 278 S.W.2d at 672.
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the chancellor gave it the same consideration as if it had been admissible?
Same-Non-hearsay Distinguished: When evidence of a relevant
statement is offered for a purpose other than as tending to prove the
truth of the matter stated, it is not objectionable as hearsay. Thus,
when defendant is charged with negligently exposing plaintiff's cattle
to poisonous substance by spraying upon vegetation upon its right of
way a substance designed to kill the vegetation, a report of a reliable
chemical company and the labels attached to the containers as to the
toxicity and composition of the substance, upon which defendant relied, are admissible as tending to prove defendant's due care. They
are not offered for the truth of the matter stated in them. As to the
labels required by law to be attached to the containers, defendant had
a right to rely upon the data set forth in them.5 4 This is a clear case
typical of situations where the evidence is offered to prove the state
of mind or knowledge of a person by showing what information was
transmitted to him.
The application of the rule to evidence offered to prove a state of
mind of the declarant or actor is not so clear, particularly in a situation such as that in Anderson v. Nichols. 55 The action was brought by
a decedent's successor in interest to set aside a deed, recorded after
decedent's death, on the ground of fraud. The deed consisted of more
than one page and there was some evidence tending to show that
a new page had been substituted for the original first page or that
the original had been changed. Plaintiff's theory was that the document when executed by decedent was intended to be, and was in
fact, an option and not a deed. Evidence of declarations by decedent
that he had given defendant an option was received over his objection.
The opinion of the court of appeals does not disclose the form of the
objection or the terms of the chancellor's ruling, but discusses the
problem as if the evidence had been received not to prove the truth
of the statement but to prove that decedent's intention at the time
the instrument in question (here assumed to be the recorded deed)
was manually transferred, was to deliver an option, and not a deed of
conveyance. It accepts as "the correct rule" that set forth in
Kelly v. Bank of America56 by the intermediate appellate court
of California: "When intent is a material element of a disputed fact,
declarations of a decedent made after as well as before an alleged
act that indicate the intent with which he performed the act are
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it is
immaterial that such declarations are self-serving. Thus, in cases
54. Tennessee Valley Electric Cooperative v. Harmon, 286 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1955).
55. 286 S.W.2d 96, 103 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
56. 112 Cal. App. 388, 246 P.2d 92, 34 A.L.R. 2d 578 (1952).
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involving the delivery of deeds, declarations of the alleged grantor
made before and after the making of the deed are admissible upon the
issue of delivery, and it is immaterial that such declarations are in
'57
the interest of the party producing them.
It is true that if the statement was not offered to prove that decedent
had given defendant an option, it was not offered to prove its truth.
If received only to show the declarant's state of mind, it must be on
the assumption that declarant at the time of the statement believed
that he had given an option, this includes the belief that he had
not given a deed; and this belief serves as a basis for an inference
that at the earlier time when he handed the instrument to defendant,
he believed he was not delivering a deed and did not intend to deliver it as a deed. Since intention is an essential of delivery, there
was no delivery even though the instrument was in form a deed. By
this line of reasoning we reach a result that comes perilously close
to hearsay in this particular case. It will be noted that the California
court designates the rule as an exception to the hearsay rule. It does,
indeed, involve the hearsay dangers affecting the sincerity and memory
of the declarant; but it is clearly distinguishable from the hearsay exception covering a declaration of presently existing state of mind,
which has no application to a declaration of a past state of mind.
And certainly the Tennessee court was not treating the evidence as
a declaration that the instrument at the time of delivery was in the
form of an option.
Same-Admissions: A judicial admission falls without the realm
of evidence. It is conclusive that for the purposes of the litigation the
admitted fact exists. Thus, an admission in a defendant's answer in
chancery is conclusive against him, not withstanding testimony by him
to the contrary at the trial or hearing.5 8
There is no longer any doubt that an extra-judicial statement by
a party is admissible against him as tending to prove the truth of the
matter stated. It is not a substitute for evidence, and if the making
and tenor of the admission is established, it is not conclusive. It
may or may not be also a prior contradictory impeaching statement
if the party as a witness has given testimony in conflict with it. In
a recent workmen's compensation case 59 defendant alleged that plaintiff was an independent contractor; it appeared without dispute that
plaintiff was employed to haul logs at a specified rate per thousand,
furnishing his own truck, and that he was injured while unloading
logs at defendant's mill. Plaintiff proved that he was paid by check
which required his signature as endorser to a printed statement on
57. 246 P.2d at 96, 34 A.L.R. 2d at 585.
58. Hewgley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 286 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1955).

59. Bond Brothers; Inc. v. 0. C. Spence, 279 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1955).
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the back thereof that it was accepted in full payment of the services
and that the endorser warranted that the rendering of the services
was "in compliance with the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, as amended." Since the act dealt only with the relationship
between management and employee, to require the plaintiff to sign
this endorsement was to assert that plaintiff was an employee, and
constituted an admission of that relationship by defendant.
Adopted Admission: A common misunderstanding of the theory of
adopted or adoptive admissions is illustrated in Voss v. State.6 O
When the confession of a codefendant was offered, the only objection
interposed was that it was made out of the presence of defendant;
and that was the only question considered. The rule in truth is
that where an accusatory statement is made in such circumstances
that defendant hears and understands it and is free to deny it but
fails to do so, it is admissible in evidence against him. That it is made
in his presence is not of itself enough. The statement is obviously
unadulterated hearsay, the accused's conduct-his reaction to the
statement-is relevant and constitutes an admission. The theory is
that his failure to deny is evidence of his belief in its truth. The New
York Court of Appeals appears to hold it admissible only where his
conduct is the equivalent of an express affirmation of the truth of
the statement.61 Uniform rule 63 (8) makes it receivable if accused
with knowledge of its content has "by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth." There is much conflict in the cases as to the effect of accused's being under arrest and
of his making an equivocal statement instead of a flat denial. The
uniform rule is in harmony with the generally accepted principle of
our adversary theory that any relevant conduct of a party to an
action is admissible as evidence against him.
Confession of Codefendant: A confession of one defendant which
implicates his codefendant is, of course, hearsay and inadmissible
against the codefendant. But it is well settled that it may be read
in evidence to the jury provided that the judge's instruction makes
it clear that the confession can be considered only against the defendant who made it.6 2 This is but one of the many instances in which
the courts attribute extraordinary capacity for intellectual and emotional control to jurors who are supposed, under normal conditions,
to be unable to evaluate ordinary hearsay evidence.
Spontaneous Statements: Before Wigmore wrote on the subject,
evidence of declarations explaining or describing an event substantially contemporaneous with the event was said to be admissible
as a part of the res gestae. Thayer condemned the use of such a
60. 278 S.W.2d 667 (Tenn. 1955).
61. People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48 (1949).
62. Kirkendoll v. State, 281 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1955).
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phrase as practically meaningless in such a situation, but justified the
reception of the evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule on
the ground that the trier would not have to rely solely on the credit
of a declarant not subject to cross-examination. If the witness was
the declarant, he could be examined under oath concerning not only
the content of his statement, but also the event, and if his auditor
was the witness, he could likewise be questioned as to what he
saw and heard which would throw any light upon the accuracy of
declarant's utterance. Wigmore re-examined the precedents and
evolved the theory that the indicium of verity which makes the utterance admissible is spontaneity. The utterance is admissible only if
made by declarant while laboring under the stress of a nervous excitement or shock caused by the startling occurrence to which the
utterance relates so that it is spontaneous and unreflective. The condition precedent to admissibility is the startling occurrence. Must
this be proved by evidence extrinsic to the utterance? This problem
is presented where the declarant was alone at the time of the alleged
occurrence and is dead at the time of trial. The comparatively few
decisions are in conflict; 63 in some of the cases the problem is ignored
or slurred, in some it may be inferred that the physical facts at the
place of the alleged occurrence and the observable condition and conduct of declarant are persuasive circumstantial evidence of the occurrence, in still others the declarant's condition is strong evidence that
something unusual enough has happened to put him in a state of
mind negativing reflective falsehood, but nothing to indicate what it
was. The tendency to liberality in admitting the evidence is noticeable
in workmen's compensation cases. This liberality is illustrated in
the brief opinion in Lee v. King Brothers Shoe Co. 64 where the evidence
of the occurrence was circumstantial and the court avoided the
term, res gestae.
Declarations of Intent: In Thornton v. Thornton65 the issue was
whether or not a grant of land to defendant, grantor's son, was
an advancement. This depended upon the intent with which it was
made. The chancellor received evidence of declarations of the
grantor to the effect that the grant was not an advancement but, on
the contrary, an attempt to equalize benefits between defendant and
complainant because of money theretofore spent by grantor on behalf of complainant. Some of the declarations were made of intent
to convey before the conveyance, some at the time of execution and
delivery of the deed, and some after that time. The case, therefore,
presented questions of admissibility of (a) evidence of declarations
of a presently existing state of mind as the basis for an inference to
63. See

MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 298, n. 35 (1954).
64. 281 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1955).
65. 282 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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the same state of mind at a later date, (b) evidence of declarations
of a presently existing state of mind accompanying an act the legal
significance of which depended upon that state of mind and (c)
evidence of declarations of a past state of mind. It also presented an
opportunity for a rational consideration and a cleancut decision of
each question. But because complainant had framed his contention
in terms of res gestae, the court rejected the opportunity, made no
distinction between the three classes of evidence, and held them all
properly received "under the circumstances" of the case.66
Parol Evidence Rule-Collateral Consistent Oral Agreement: In
Tennessee, where the Statute of Frauds does not require a writing for
the creation of a trust in realty, evidence is admissible to prove
that the grantee in a deed absolute on its face agreed to hold in trust
the property therein conveyed. 67 This is the generally accepted view,
and various explanations for this exception to the parol evidence rule
have been offered, 68 but none of them can blink the fact that the agreement modifies the express terms of the deed, and that the apparently
complete writing is treated as only a partial integration of the transaction.
Same-Warranties:In Huddleston v. Lee, 69 an action for recission
by the buyer, the bill of sale of a freezer contained a printed "warranty" that the seller would service and replace all defective parts that
developed within one year, "and the correction of such defects by
the seller shall constitute a fulfillment of its obligations to the
purchaser hereunder." The evidence showed, and the chancellor found,
that the buyer fully disclosed to the seller the purpose for which
he desired the freezer, that it did not perform and was incapable
of performing that purpose, and that the implied warranty of fitness
for the purpose was not inconsistent with the printed express warranty. This seems in accord with the Restatement of Contracts for
the express warranty is not of like kind with the implied warranty
and parties do not ordinarily make express provision that the article
is fit for the purpose for which it was, to the knowledge of the seller,
purchased. But the court of appeals upheld the chancellor's decision
on another ground, namely, that the express representation of the
seller that the freezer would do the work for which it was purchased
was the inducing cause of the purchase, and was no part of the contract of sale. Though there was no fraud on the seller's part, the misrepresentation relied upon by the buyer, justified his demand for
recission of the contract of sale. This may bring the case within the
reason of section 238 of the Restatement which makes receivable
66. 282 S.W.2d at 366.
67. Brantley v. Brantley, 281 S.W.2d 668 (Tenn. 1955).
68. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2437 (3d ed. 1940).
69. 284 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
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parol evidence "to prove facts in a suit for rescission or reformation of
the written agreement showing such mistake as affords ground for
the desired remedy." And it is generally held that the rule does not
prevent a party from proving facts which make the agreement void
or voidable.
Same-Interpretation:In interpreting a particular provision of a
will, the court looks to the entire document to ascertain the manner
in which the testator uses the applicable language, and receives evidence of all the circumstances in which the will was executed. Consequently, the court considers the language in which testator provided
for devises in case the devisee predeceased or survived him in interpreting a provision making a devise dependent upon survivorship of
one or the other of two named persons, and holds admissible evidence
of the physical condition of the testator at the time of the execution of
0
the will.7
Same-Strangers to Agreement: It is generally said that the parol
evidence rule has no application in an action between one of the parties to the writing and a stranger, for the stranger cannot be said to
have agreed that the writing was the final and complete expression
of the agreement. Williston, Corbin and Wigmore contend that where
the issue depends upon the legal relations between the parties
created by the writing, the rule should be applicable in full force.
And such was the effect of the ruling of the trial court in Swift v.
Beaty.7' The court of appeals held this ruling erroneous, but not
ground for reversal, since the legal effect of the writing and that
of the situation disclosed by the parol evidence were the same.
WITNESSES

Examination-Form of Objection to Testimony: The rule applied
in most jurisdictions is that the trial judge's ruling on a general objection will not be reviewed. The objector must state the specific
ground of his objection. This is for the protection of the judge and
of the adverse party. This rule was applied in McParland v. Pruitt 72
where the objection was overruled. Where the objection is sustained,
it is generally held that the proponent is entitled to be informed of the
reason in order that he may eliminate the ground for the objection, if
possible, by reframing the question or laying a proper foundation for
it.
Same-Form of Question: Ordinarily a party may not lead his own
witness, for the court wants to hear what the witness has to say
rather than a mere affirmation by him of suggested statements by
70. Johnson v. Speer, 279 S.W.2d 711 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
71. 282 S.W.2d 655 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
72. 284 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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counsel. But even in ,a criminal case the court may in its discretion
permit a leading question by the prosecution, except where the leading appears to have prejudiced the defendant. 73 And this is particularly
true where the question merely directs the attention of the witness to
the desired subject without suggesting the desired answer.
Competency: In an action against two defendants as partners for
breach of contract, one defendant is competent to testify to the relationship of partners between him and the other defendant. Early
Tennessee cases to the contrary were applying the common law rule
which made interested persons incompetent as witnesses'. This rule
was changed in Tennessee in 1867. 74 It may be a curious commentary
upon the "guile or gall" of the profession that the court in 1955
felt it necessary to point out (a) the distinction between the
hearsay prior statement of this witness that he and the other defendant were partners and his testimony upon the stand, and (b) the
present inapplicability of these ancient precedents cited in defendant's
brief.75
Privilege-Identity of Informer: Where defendant was arrested
without a warrant, it may be shown in support of the issue of probable
cause that the arresting officer acted upon information received
from a person from whom on other occasions he had received similar
accurate information without disclosing the identity of the informer.76
Expert Opinion: In most situations the opinion of an expert is not
conclusive as against lay testimony. For example, the trier of fact
may accept the testimony of an injured workman that he continually
suffered pain in determining the extent of his disability notwithstanding the testimony of a qualified expert of lack of physiological condi77
tions that would cause the alleged pain.
Impeachment-One's Own Witness: The rule which forbids a party
to impeach his own witness does not prevent him from introducing
evidence contrary to that given by the witness. 78 The proponent may
be regarded as vouching for the character of his witness for veracity,
but he cannot be held to guarantee the accuracy of his perception or
memory or of his capacity to express himself by the accurate use of
language.
Same-By Demonstrationon Cross-examination:Defendant on trial
for murder of her husband, testified on direct examination that she
73. Hale v. State, 281 S.W.2d 51 (Tenn. 1955), a case which has been much
criticised on other grounds and in which Chief Justice Neil and Mr. Justice
Burnett wrote powerful dissents for different reasons.
74. Wyatt v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 64 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
75. 281 S.W.2d at 67.
76. Simmons v. State, 281 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1955).
77. Block Coal &Coke Co. v. Gibson, 285 S.W.2d 112 (Tenn. 1955).
78. Hewgley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 286 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn.
App. M.S. 1955).
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was a taxi driver and that for her protection as such she carried the
pistol which she drew from her bosom when she was attacked and
knocked down by her husband. On cross-examination she was required to place the pistol in her bosom or brassiere to illustrate how
she carried it. Held, this was proper as affecting the credibility of
her direct testimony.79 This seems a clear example of demonstrative
evidence to test the validity of oral testimony.
Same-By Evidence of Prior Disgraceful Conduct: In a thoroughly
considered opinion 80 Mr. Justice Prewitt reviewed the prior decisions
of the court holding admissible on cross-examination of a witness
questions as to prior disgraceful conduct and as to prior indictments,
arrests and charges of offenses. Speaking for the court, he declared
that the earlier decisions allowing questions as to accusations, charges
or indictments should no longer be followed. The inquiries should
be confined to conviction of offenses involving moral turpitude. The
case at bar involved cross-examination of the accused but the cited
precedents included cross-examination of other witnesses as well.
The conclusion to be drawn from the discussion is that hereafter in
Tennessee a witness, subject to his claim of privilege against selfincrimination, may be asked to reveal any prior conduct involving
moral turpitude and that his answer may not be contradicted by independent evidence-the cross-examiner must take the answer of the
witness. The witness may not be questioned concerning prior accusations, charges or indictments even for offenses involving moral turpitude. Mr. Chief Justice Neil in his concurring opinion 8' asserts that
the usual rule which excludes evidence of the commission of other
similar crimes by defendant should be applied even where the
questions are asked only to affect credibility. This seems a distinct
limitation upon the main opinion except in so far as the privilege
against self-incrimination is involved, as it would be in most pertinent
situations.
Effect of Impeachment: The maxim, falsus in uno falsus in omnibus,
when carefully stated, means that if the trier finds that a witness
makes a false statement which he knows to be false upon a material
matter, the trier may reject his entire testimony except where it is
corroborated by other credible evidence; and a charge to this effect is
justified. It is, no doubt, true that a jury may refuse to credit all
the testimony of a witness which it has reason to disbelieve, so that the
falsus in uno doctrine is probably useless, if not misleading. In
McParland v. Pruitt 2 the testimony of each of the two defendants
was contradicted concerning a fact within their personal knowledge,
79. Dennis v. State, 279 S.W.2d 512 (Tenn. 1955).

80. Posley v. State, 288 S.W.2d 455 (Tenn. 1956).
81. 288 S.W.2d at 458.
82. 284 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
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which was material and, if false, was knowingly false. In these
circumstances the court, without enumerating these details, declared the maxim applicable.
JuDIcLAL NOTICE

The current Tennessee cases on judicial notice cover (1) notice of
the act of Congress providing for federal credit unions and permitting
them to charge specified rates of interest, 83 (2) notice of matters of
common knowledge and notoriety, for example, the use of the usual
abbreviations for dates such as 3-7-54 to indicate March 7, 1954,84
and the facts that the temperature inside a steel river barge is on
warm days higher than that outside and a person may have a socalled stomach upset caused by some internal condition rather than
by an external condition. 85 In Howard v. Haven86 the court conceded that where a principal is sought to be held liable for the wrong
of his agent on the doctrine of respondeat superior a finding for the
servant is inconsistent with a finding against the principal, but held
that where plaintiff sought recovery both under that doctrine and
on the theory that the principal was a joint tort-feasor with the agent,
the finding for the agent did not prevent a valid finding against the
principal. In its discussion the court said that it took judicial cognizance
that the duties of the agent, here the "business agent" of the local
trade union, "related to the making of contracts under which only
members of his organization would have the right of employment ....
We think it can be said without serious dispute that it was the business
of the Union to make war upon every contractor who refused to employ its members; and they were so acting in the instant case."
Does this mean that the duties of a union's business agent generally
are judicially noticeable, or that the duties of one business agent of
this local union are within the realm of temporary local judicial
notice, or is the court merely saying that the conduct in question was
within the scope of this agent's authority under the circumstances
appearing in the evidence? To what extent is this subject a matter
of common knowledge or notoriety?
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The current decisions dealing with jurisdiction and venue present
no problems of major importance in general. They are concerned
principally with statutory interpretation. Consequently this section
is little, if anything, more than a digest.
83. Van Pelt v. P. and L. Federal Credit Union, 282 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. App.

W.S. 1955).
84. Grace v. State, 281 S.W.2d 641 (Tenn. 1955).
85. Nashville Bridge Co. v. Todd, 286 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1956).
86. 281 S.W.2d 480, 485 (Tenn. 1955).

1072

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 9

Process-OriginalAttachment: When an original attachment by
garnishment has been made by service of the garnishment summons
and the credit has been thereby impounded, the court may in its
discretion order the summons to be87 amended as to the date at which
the garnishee is required to appear.
Service of Summons-Time for: The statute which authorizes service of summons upon the Secretary of State in an action against a
non-resident motorist limits the authority of the Secretary to accept service as agent of the motorist to one year after the accident
or injury in question. It is not a statute of limitation and is not
affected by the statute authorizing a new action to be brought within
one year after a judgment against the plaintiff in an action timely
brought upon a ground not concluding his right of action, as on a
plea in abatement for wrong venue. Service of summons upon the
Secretary more than a year after the accident is ineffective.8
JurisdictionOver Person: Under Chapter 188 of the Public Acts of
1953, proceedings may be begun in this state for the purpose of having
action taken in a sister state against a person therein who has
abandoned his dependents in this state. But a court of this state has
no jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment against a defendant
89
without service of process upon him within the state.
Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter-Court of General Sessions:
Though the court's jurisdiction is limited to misdemeanors and it
may not impose a fine exceeding fifty dollars, it has power to accept a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor on account of conduct which
amounts to an offense beyond the jurisdiction of the court, if the
accused waives indictment or presentment and trial by jury. A
judgment of conviction entered upon such a plea and waiver is a
90
But such a court has
bar to further prosecution for that offense.
no power to suspend sentence under the small offense law if its jurisdiction is limited to that of a justice of the peace in civil and criminal
cases.

91

Same-Chancery: Chancery has exclusive jurisdiction to set up a
will that has been lost, destroyed or suppressed. In circuit court a
husband, who in case of intestacy would take no part of his deceased
wife's estate which consisted solely of realty, sought to contest her
will on the ground of testamentary incapacity, alleging that he was the
sole beneficiary of an earlier will which, if not in existence, was
destroyed without her knowledge. The court held that this was in
effect an action to set up an earlier lost or destroyed will, or to
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Newport v. Semones, 286 S.W.2d 876 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
Oliver v. Altsheler, 278 S.W.2d 675 (Tenn. 1955).
State v. Perry, 280 S.W.2d 919 (Tenn. 1955).
State v. Simmons, 287 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1956).
Cates v. State, 279 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1955).
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probate an earlier will, and that he had no standing as a contestant
in the pending action without first taking proper proceedings in
92
another court.
Chancery has no jurisdiction to interfere with the circuit court in
performance of its duties nor can it act as a court of review to correct errors of the circuit court, but where a decree of a circuit court
in a divorce action is void, chancery does have power to enjoin a
party from prosecuting a petition for contempt for refusal of the
93
adverse party to obey the decree.
While chancery has jurisdiction to set aside or cancel a written
instrument on the ground that it was obtained by fraud and to,
grant incidental legal relief in an equitable proceeding, it has no
jurisdiction to entertain an action to recover unliquidated damages
for personal injury merely because plaintiff seeks to have set aside
for fraud a release which he expects defendant to set up as a defense.
The gist of the action is legal. The plaintiff may plead and prove the
fraud as an avoidance of the defense in the law action. 94 It seems
obvious that if chancery were to take jurisdiction, it would be under
its inherent power as a court of equity and not under the statute
giving it jurisdiction over specified subject matter. The court does not
consider the question whether fraud in the inducement in a simple
contract action is a legal defense, and if so whether that doctrine applies to the issue when raised in a replication. In assumpsit, under
the common law decisions beginning in the latter part of the
eighteenth century, fraud in the inducement was a legal defense,
and an equitable bill to cancel a simple contract obligation on that
ground would not be entertained because of the adequate remedy at
law. This doctrine was not extended to instruments under seal until
a much later period. The discussion in the instant case is concerned
principally with determining whether the gist of the action is equitable
with legal relief as incidental or vice versa; and the result seems
thoroughly sensible whether or not the release was under seal.
Chancery has no jurisdiction of an original petition to compel a
telephone company to extend its services to a community or to
impose a penalty for refusing to serve individuals in that community.
The Railroad and Public Utilities Commission has exclusive original
jurisdiction of a petition for the extension of service, and exhaustion
of remedies before the Commission is a condition precedent to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the court. 95 Nor does chancery have jurisdiction to order the Board of Claims to entertain a claim for wrongful
death against the state.9
92. Warmath v. Smith, 279 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1955).
93. Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1955).
94. Tucker v. Simmons, 287 S.W.2d 19 (Tenn. 1956).
95. Breeden v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 285 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. 1955).
96. Hill v. Beeler, 286 S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. 1956).
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Same-Circuit Court: A circuit court has no power to award
alimony to a wife where divorce is granted to the husband. A
decree awarding alimony in such a situation is void, and an order to
show cause in a contempt proceeding for refusal to obey the decree
is void. The wife may be enjoined from further prosecution of that
97
proceeding.
Venue: In an action against sureties on the bond of the Commissioner of Finance for damages for a tort committed by him, the
venue is not determined by the place where the tort was committed
notwithstanding the statute which authorizes an action against a tortfeasor to be brought in the county where the tort occurred. The
action must be brought in the county of the official residence of the
Commissioner, namely, Davidson County.98
The venue of an action for wrongful death, which is not a local
action, is to be determined on the theory that the statutory beneficiaries are not parties to the action brought by the administrator.
Hence, although the beneficiaries of plaintiff administrator and the
administrator defendant reside in the same county, the plaintiff
administrator who resides in another county may bring and maintain
the action in the county where the defendant administrator was at the
time the action was instituted. 99
TRIAL

Right to Jury: In an inquisition of lunacy in the county court
there is no right of trial by jury unless demanded by the guardian
ad litem of the party or the party himself. That is to say, the court
has no duty to provide a jury of its own motion.10 0 A person who is
charged with an offense may, in a court of general sessions, expressly
waive a jury and plead guilty to a misdemeanor after expressly
waiving indictment or presentment, although the act charged constitutes an offense beyond the jurisdiction of the court. 1 1
Composition of Jury-Mixed Race: In a prosecution for murder
against a Negro and a white man as codefendants, of 18 Negro jurymen, eight were excused by the court on the voir dire, seven were
challenged peremptorily by the State, one by the Negro defendant,
and two who had been accepted by the state and the Negro were
peremptorily challenged by the white defendant. Thereupon the
Negro defendant moved orally to quash the panel, which motion the
court properly denied. Obviously there was no discrimination against
97. Brown v. Brown, 281 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. 1955).

See textual material

supported by note 93 supra.
98. Keefe v. Atkins, 285 S.W.2d 338 (Tenn. 1955).
99. Denny v. Webb, 281 S.W.2d 698 (Tenn. 1955).
100. Craddock v. Calcutt, 285 S.W.2d 528, 537 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
101. State v. Simmons, 287 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1956). See textual material
supported by note 90, supra.
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defendant in selecting the jury, and the white defendant had a right
to exercise his peremptory challenges for any reason or without
102
reason.
A person who is unable to read or write is not incompetent to serve
as a juror even in a prosecution for murder, in which the instructions
103
to the jury must be in writing.
Challenge to Array or Panel: A challenge to the array or panel
must be made in writing. There is no reversible error in overruling
an oral challenge. 104 A motion to quash the panel because a codefendant had removed all remaining Negroes on the panel by peremptory challenge, 10 5 or a motion that the entire list be disqualified for
cause made after the state had accepted the list, is treated as a
10 6
challenge to the panel or array.
Challenge to Poll---Trial by Judge: In a case where two jurors were
challenged on the ground of actual bias in having stated that the
defendants were guilty and ought to be killed, the evidence, heard
by the trial judge, was in some conflict. He found the challenges untrue and held the jurors competent. The court applied the generally
accepted rule that the decision of the trial judge, like the verdict
of a jury in a civil action, will not be reversed if supported by evidence. The credibility of the witnesses is for the judge. 0 7 At common law the sufficiency of a challenge was determined by triers selected for that purpose, and their decision was final and not subject to
review, but today in most jurisdictions, the trial is by the judge in
both civil and criminal cases.
Effect of Erroneous Ruling: During defendant's examination of the
jurors on voir dire, he exhausted all challenges before juror number
twelve was called. He had challenged five jurors for cause and after
the trial judge overruled each challenge, defendant did not peremptorily challenge any one of the five. He was denied the right to
challenge number twelve peremptorily. The supreme court refused
to consider the ruling as to any one of the five challenged for cause
on the ground that the defendant should have exercised one of his
peremptories on each and held it no reversible error to refuse the
challenge to juror number twelve.'0 8 This must mean that when a
defendant is presented with a juror, he must exercise all available
challenges and use a peremptory even upon a disqualified juror when
the trial judge refuses to disqualify. This compels him to take chances
102. Kirkendoll v. State, 281 S.W.2d 243, 253 (Tenn. 1955).
103. Id. at 255.
104. Id. at 253.
105. Ibid.
106. Hale v. State, 281 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Tenn. 1955).
107. Kirkendoll v. State, 281 S.W.2d 243, 249 (Tenn. 1955).
108. Hale v. State, 281 S.W.2d 51, 56-57 (Tenn. 1955). See also Kirkendoll
v. State, 281 S.W.2d 243, 248 (Tenn. 1955) as to peremptory challenge.
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upon the qualities of the jurors still to be drawn. In this case it deprived him of the right to remove a qualified juror, number twelve,
by peremptory challenge. The result of this procedure in a case, in
which the right to peremptory challenge in the circumstances was of
special importance, was that defendant may have been compelled
to accept five biased jurors and one competent juror to whom he
objected for undisclosed reasons. It may be true that there is no
denial of due process in abolishing the common law right of an
accused to peremptory challenges even in a capital case and in substituting therefor regulation by statute, and that it is not reversible
error to furnish him a jury of which a disqualified juror is a member so long as he has an unused peremptory at the time the jury is completed. It may be true also that the right to challenge is the right
to reject, not the right to select, and that an accused is entitled only
to a trial by twelve qualified jurors. But it seems extremely harsh
in fact to destroy the value of defendant's privilege to use his quota
of peremptories by assuming, first, that he waived his right to exclude incompetent jurors and, second, that the five challenged jurors
were competent, and then declaring that even an erroneous denial
of the right to use a peremptory is harmless so long as all of the
twelve jurors were competent.
Discretionary Control by Judge: The order of proof is determined
by the trial judge in the exercise of his sound discretion. He may permit a party to introduce in rebuttal evidence which should have been
introduced as a part of his main case. 109 And it is well settled in Tennessee that the judge may put questions to a witness necessary to
elicit facts overlooked by counsel which tend to protect the rights
of the parties. 110
Motions During Trial-Motion to Dismiss the Panel for Misconduct
of Counsel: In a criminal case in which the death penalty was
authorized, the prosecutor asked each juror whether if he found the
defendant guilty, he would vote to impose the death penalty; each
juror who was accepted by the state answered in the affirmative.
The defendant's motion that the panel be disqualified on this account was denied. The court held this motion was a challenge to the
array and need not be considered because not in writing."1 This is
obviously an extremely technical ruling, since the material facts all
occurred in the presence of the court. The chief justice in a powerful dissent declared that he knew of "no case in the judicial history
of this State where the prosecution was ever permitted to ask a
juror on his voir dire if he will agree to fix a defendant's punishment
at death." It is believed that the court might well have treated this
109. Newport v. Semones, 286 S.W.2d 876 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
110. Bond Brothers, Inc. v. Spence, 279 S.W.2d 509 (Tenn. 1955).
111. Hale v. State, 281 S.W.2d 51, 56 (Tenn. 1955).
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motion not as a challenge to the array but as a motion to dismiss
the jurors for misconduct of the prosecuting attorney or as a challenge
to each of the selected jurors because he had made a statement under
oath which the chief justice said made it "extremely difficult" for
him "to enter upon a consideration of the case with an open mind
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused and what penalty should be
imposed."1 2 Generally the supreme court is slow to give a restricted
meaning to the language of a motion which will prevent a fair consideration of the actual problem thereby intended to be presented.
Same-Motion for Directed Verdict: Defendant may make a motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case or at the close
of all the evidence, or at both times. If his motion made at the close of
plaintiff's case is erroneously denied and he then introduces evidence, he waives the error; and if he makes a like motion at the close
113
of the evidence, only the latter motion will be considered on appeal.
This is the universally accepted view except where an abortive statute
provides otherwise; but in some jurisdictions the trial judge may not
at the close of plaintiff's case entertain a motion for a directed verdict
as distinguished from a dismissal or nonsuit:
Same-Motion to Dismiss in Chancery: In equity practice a motion
to dismiss at the close of the plaintiff's case is not to be entertained;
it should, if entertained, be treated as a submission of the case to the
chancellor on plaintiff's evidence alone. It is improper practice to
deny the motion and then proceed to hear defendant's evidence. Even
at the close of the case, the proper time for a motion to dismiss is
after the court has made findings of fact." 4
Charge to Jury-Requests to Charge: In a criminal case the trial
judge must give instructions upon all fundamental matters including
reasonable doubt, the weight to be given to a dying declaration, and,
where the evidence of guilt is solely circumstantial, the rule governing
that kind of evidence. As to non-fundamental matters, a request is
required under Code section 40-2517.115 A request to charge which
is inapplicable to an issue made by the evidence is properly denied.
The court's duty is to charge upon the law applicable to the facts of
the case as presented by the evidence. These rules were applied in
a condemnation case where defendant requested an instruction as to
value of the condemned land. 116
Same-Coercing Agreement: An instruction to the jury after it
has announced that it is unable to agree is not objectionable as
coercing the minority jurors which tells the jurors that it is their duty
112. Id. at 61.
113. McParland v. Pruitt, 284 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).

114. Humphreys v. Humphreys, 281 S.W.2d 271 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).

115. Bishop v. State, 287 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1956).
116. Stroud v. State, 279 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1955).
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to decide the case if they can conscientiously do so and to listen
to each other's arguments with a disposition to be convinced; that if
a majority are against him, a minority juror should consider whether
his doubts are reasonable; that jurors should not go contrary to their
convictions, but they should give heed to the opinions of their fellows
and "by reasonable concessions" reach a conclusion "to which all
17
can scrupulously adhere.""
Misconduct of Jury-Separation:The general rule at common law
is that separation of jurors in a criminal case vitiates their later verdict unless it is shown that there was no communication with them
by outsiders. This rule is not applicable to the separation of the
single female member of the jury from the others when an officer had
charge of her during the period of separation and another officer or
other officers had charge of the other eleven. Chapter 71 of the Public
Acts of 1951 specifically provides that it shall not be unlawful for
women members to be segregated from the male members when
outside the court room so long as each member is in the custody of
an officer or officers duly sworn for that purpose.118
Verdict-Excessive Punitive Damages: The court of appeals has
ruled that punitive damages are always allowable in an action for
seduction, but in an opinion in which the facts concerning the plaintiff are set out in sordid detail and a verdict for $5,000 compensatory
damages was upheld, it ordered a new trial unless plaintiff should remit $2,500 of an award of $5,000 punitive damages. 119
Same-Inconsistent Verdicts: Where plaintiff sues master and servant jointly for an injury for which under the evidence the master
could be found responsible for his personal breach of duty to plaintiff
and vicariously responsible for his servant's breach of duty, or both,
a verdict against the master is not inconsistent with a verdict in
favor of the servant. 120 But where a wife sues a defendant for personal
injuries and her husband sues for damages caused by loss of her services due to those injuries, and the actions are consolidated for trial,
a verdict in favor of the wife in her action is inconsistent with a verdict
in favor of the defendant in the husband's action, and both verdicts
must be set aside.12 ' In the former situation the verdict may be based
on a finding that the master was personally at fault and the servant
blameless. In the latter, no similar explanation is possible. The
jurors either totally misunderstood the judge's instructions or they
deliberately disregarded them.
Judgment-Res Adjudicata: A decision of a county court denying
117. Simmons v. State, 281 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1955).
118. Steadman v. State, 282 S.W.2d 777 (Tenn. 1955).
119. Caccamisi v. Thurmond, 282 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
120. Howard v. Haven, 281 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1955).
121. Berry v. Foster, 287 S.W.2d 16 (Tenn. 1956).
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a petition for adoption on the grounds that petitioners were not fit
persons and that the child's welfare would not be promoted thereby,
affirmed on appeal, is a bar to a subsequent similar petition by the
same parties. The principle of res adjudicata is applicable to a decision regarding an adoption in the absence of a showing of change
in relevant conditions. 122 And a decree of divorce in an action by
the wife against the husband in which the court had jurisdiction of
both the subject matter and the parties is res adjudicata and a bar
to an action by the husband to set aside the decree on the ground that
he was never married to the wife because previously married to
another woman from whom he had never been divorced. 123 His
remedy, if any, was by appeal from the earlier decree.
APPEAL AND ERROR

What is Reviewable: No appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal
upon a charge of contempt of court for violation of an injunction issued
124
in a divorce proceeding.
Normally an appeal or writ of error lies only from a final judgment.
Thus, where there were four parties defendant in an action for personal
injuries and demurrers interposed by three of them were sustained but
the action remained undecided as to the fourth, the appeal by plaintiff was dismissed. The provision for a discretionary appeal applies
only in equity.12 And a judgment committing an accused to a hospital for the criminal insane for observation and treatment entered
on a verdict finding him presently insane, so as not to be presently
triable for the offense charged, is not appealable.'2
A discretionary appeal will lie from an order of the chancellor
denying a new trial after an order confirming or approving the report
of the master, and the court of appeals will, in suitable circumstances,
dispose of the entire case, 127 for after an appeal is perfected the lower
court loses jurisdiction until after remand.
By What Court: Where the chancellor dismissed the intervenor's
petition after a hearing on the merits, appeal or writ of error lies
only to the court of appeals, and if taken to the supreme court will
be transferred to the court of appeals for consideration and decision.'2
Prerequisites:The statutory time for filing the bond necessary to
perfect an appeal may be extended by order of the court, but if
122. Whitley v. Reeves, 281 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).

123. Rutledge v. Rutledge, 281 S.W.2d 666 (Tenn. 1955).
124. Schwalb v. Schwalb, 282 S.W.2d 661 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).

125. Potter v. Sanderson, 286 S.W.2d 873 (Tenn. 1956).
126. Cogburn v. State, 281 S.W.2d 38 (Tenn. 1955).
127. Huntington v. Lumpkin, 281 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).

128. Goins v. Yowell, 285 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. 1955).
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the bond is not filed within the time set in the order, the appeal
129
must be dismissed.
Scope of Review: The circuit court on appeal from decision of the
beer board revoking a beer license considers only whether there
was sufficient evidence to support the decision, not whether the evidence preponderates in favor of it. 130 But where the chancellor is
called upon to review a decision of the Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission on the ground that the rates prescribed are confiscatory,
the chancellor must review the entire record and exercise his independent judgment on the facts as well as on the law, and if he
has proceeded on the theory that he is to determine only whether
the commission's decision is supported by credible evidence, the
13
case will be referred back to him for further consideration. '
Same-Criminal Case: Where the accused on appeal complains
that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence, the supreme court
inquires only whether the evidence preponderates against the verdict, and where accused's own testimony conflicts with that of other
witnesses, the court accepts the determination of the jury as to which
is to be credited. 132
Same-Chancery: when the court of appeals reviews a decree in
equity, it examines the facts de novo and is not bound by the finding
of the trial judge. A divorce action is for this purpose treated as an
action in equity even when tried by the circuit court. 133 The court
of appeals exercises the same power of review on an appeal in an
injunction action as to an issue not submitted to a jury, which is
deemed to have been reserved for decision by the chancellor. 134 But
a finding of fact by the chancellor affirmed by the court of appeals
is conclusive on later review by the supreme court. 135 And the
chancellor's ruling in dissolving a temporary injunction is review136
able only for abuse of discretion.
Record on Appeal-Correctionand Disregard of Technical Defects:
By diminution of the record and by applying Code section 27-110, the
record may be corrected to show authentication by the trial judge,
and it will be presumed that the signature to the bill of exceptions
was made prior to the filing thereof. Hence, the court may consider a
129. Scott v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 286 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1954).
130. Presson v. Benton County Beer Board, 281 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. 1955).
131. Southern Continental Tel. Co. v. Railroad and Public Utilities Comm'n.,
285 S.W.2d 115 (Tenn. 1955).
132. Smith v. State, 280 S.W.2d 922 (Tenn. 1955).
133. Humphreys v. Humphreys, 281 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
134. Murrell v. Bentley, 286 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
135. Howard v. Haven, 281 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1955); Miller v. Hubbs, 285
S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1955).

136. Alexander v. Alexander, 286 S.W.2d 104 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1955).
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bill of exceptions contained in a transcript of the record notwithstanding defects which are thus curable. 3 7
Same-Bill of Exceptions: Where the bill of exceptions on appeal
from a judgment on a verdict directed for defendant does not recite
that it contains all the evidence, the court will examine the bill to
determine whether it contains evidence which Would justify a
finding in favor of plaintiff; if not, the judgment will be affirmed.' 38
But if material in the transcript filed with the court is not included
in the bill of exceptions, it cannot be considered as a ground
of error. This rule is applied even in a criminal case in which the
material in question was a transcript of the prosecutor's speech
claimed to constitute reversible misconduct. 139 This does not apply to
the pleadings or other parts of the formal record. If they show without dispute the materials that present the pertinent issue on appeal,
no bill of exceptions is necessary. 140 Still, where there is proffer of
a written instrument and no demand for oyer, the instrument does not
become a part of the formal record, and a certified copy of it included in the record on appeal in which there was no bill of exceptions cannot be considered by the court of appeals.14'
Same-Sufficiency of Basis for Review of Exception-Ruling on
Evidence: Ordinarily when an exception is sustained to a question
put to a witness, the questioner must make an offer of proof or otherwise get on the record the expected answer so that the court can determine whether it would constitute relevant, competent evidence.
But this is not true where the court erroneously holds that the defense
which the evidence tends to sustain cannot be proved in the action. 142
To call all witnesses and put to each pertinent questions would be a
mere waste of time. Likewise, when the trial judge informed counsel
that he would rule improper any argument for a specified finding
by the jury and would sustain any objection thereto made by the adverse party, it was totally unnecessary for counsel to attempt to
make the argument and require an objection by the adverse party
143
and a ruling thereon.
Assignment of Error: On certiorari to the supreme court from the
court of appeals the court will not consider any alleged error of the
court of appeals which is not set forth in the assignment accompanying
the petition for certiorari.' 44
137. Simmons v. State, 281 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1955).

138. Russel v. Chattanooga, 279 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1954).
139. Hargrove v. State, 281 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. 1955).
140. State ex rel., etc. v. Simpson, 281 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1955).
141. Van Pelt v. P. and L. Federal Credit Union, 282 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn.
App. W.S. 1955).
142. Nashville v. Drake, 281 S.W.2d 681 (Tenn. 1955).

143. Burkett v. Johnston, 282 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
144. Berry v. Foster, 287 S.W.2d 16 (Tenn. 1955).
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Rehearing: The purpose to be served by a rehearing is to bring to
the attention of the court matters overlooked in the original decision,
not to reargue matters duly considered and determined. Consequently, the court will deny a petition which alleges that it had
not considered and rendered an opinion upon specified assignments
of error when the original opinion and decision dealt specifically with
the subject matter of these assignments, 145 or a petition which asks
the court to reconsider and overrule a precedent that the court
to the
deliberately followed in preference to decisions in other states
146
contrary, though the latter represent the weight of authority.
United States DistrictCourts
The following decisions by United States District Courts in Tennessee deal with procedural questions of interest and importance to
Tennessee lawyers.
Removability from State Courts: The Fair Labor Standards Act
provides that an action may be maintained in any court of competent
jurisdiction and it is settled that the plaintiff may maintain his action
in either the state or the federal court where jurisdiction over the
defendant's person is secured. Prior to the revision of 1948 the
cases were in conflict as to whether such an action for less than $3000
brought in a state court was subject to removal. Section 1441 (a) of
the present Code reads: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by
Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State Court of which
the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction may
be removed by the defendant .... -147 The excepting clause was not
in the former provision, and the Revisers' Note states that they intended to clear up previous ambiguities. In 1953 Judge Goddard in
the southern district of New York held that since the Fair Labor
Standards Act did not forbid removal, an action brought thereunder
was removable. 148 Judge Robert Taylor reached the same conclusion,149 and cited the Asher case in support of his decision.
Parties: The administrator of a decedent appointed in Kentucky
brought action in Tennessee to recover for the wrongful death of the
decedent under the Kentucky statute which provided that the recovery should be "for the benefit and go to" specified kindred of
decedent. The defendant insisted that plaintiff had no capacity to
maintain the action. Judge William E. Miller, in applying federal
rule 17 (b), declared that there was no controlling Tennessee decision,
and held that since the great weight of authority elsewhere was con145. Harris v. Buchignani, 285 S.W.2d 108 (Tenn. 1955).
146. Evans v. Mayberry, 279 S.W.2d 705 (Tenn. 1955).

147. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(a) (1952).
148. Asher v. William L. Crow Constr. Co., 118 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. N.Y.

1953).

149. Buckles v. Morristown Kayo Co., 132 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
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trary to the defendant's contention, the Kentucky administrator was
the proper and competent party plaintiff. 150
Same-Class Action: Several Negroes brought action for themselves
and all other Negroes similarly situated for a declaratory judgment
and an injunction against racial discrimination in the public high
schools in Anderson County. Judge Robert Taylor held that the
action was properly brought as a class action, and that it did not
become moot when the named plaintiffs ceased to be members of the
class. The action stands for trial for the benefit of members of the
class.151
Remedies-Habeas Corpus: The Tennessee Habitual Criminal Act,
as interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court and as applied in the
instant case, does not require the accused to be notified that he is being
charged as an habitual criminal and subject to additional penalties if
convicted. This the district court held to be violative of the fourteenth amendment. The accused had been convicted and allowed
an appeal. His attorney neglected to perfect the appeal and to have a
bill of exceptions prepared. After accused was in prison starting to
serve the life sentence imposed, he sought habeas corpus in the state
courts and was defeated. He was unable to appeal because he lacked
means to furnish the required cost bond. Thereby he had exhausted
his remedies in the state courts and was entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States court; and on the merits he was entitled to
152
prevail.
Jurisdiction-ForeignCorporation: Any foreign corporation carrying on business in a substantial manner in Tennessee is subject
to service of process under Chapter 13, Public Acts of Tennessee, 1929.
If such a corporation fails to appoint an agent for service of process,
service made upon the Secretary of State is valid. Whether the conduct of the corporation constitutes the prescribed measure of business
53
is a question of fact for the court.'
Judicial Notice: The United States district court sitting in Tennessee will judicially notice the laws of Tennessee and of Missouri.
Tennessee has adopted the uniform Judicial Notice Act. Hence the
United States district court may act either under the general common
law rule which makes all laws of the states and territories subject to
its judicial notice or under rule 43 (a) which makes the liberal state
54
rule applicable.
150. Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Co. v. Baese, 136 F. Supp. 683 (M.D.
Tenn. 1955).

151. McSwain v. County Board of Education, 138 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn.

1956).
152.
153.
1955).
154.
(M.D.

Rhea v. Edwards, 136 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).

Radford v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 128 F. Supp. 775 (E.D. Tenn.
Insurance Research Serv. v. Associates Finance Corp., 134 F. Supp. 54
Tenn. 1955).
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United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
The procedural decisions of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
represent applications of generally accepted rules. A brief digest of
them may be of some value to the profession.
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Pleading: At common law and under a typical code a party may
plead a document by alleging its legal effect or setting forth its content verbatim in the pleading or by both. Under the code he may
also incorporate the document in his pleading by reference-a verbatim copy attached thereto as an exhibit. By alleging its legal
effect he is obviously pleading a conclusion of law, and if there is an
inconsistency between his conclusion and the proper legal interpretation of the document, his conclusion is of no effect at whatever stage
of the proceeding the inconsistency is made to appear, whether in the
pleading or in the evidence. This rule is not changed by the Federal
55
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Motion before Trial-ForRemoval to United States District CourtTime for: A motion to remove an action to the United States
district court was timely when nrade within twenty days after receipt by defendant of the declaration, although the summons had been
served upon the Secretary of State four months earlier in purported
compliance with statute. After removal the case stood subject to
all defenses, including lack of jurisdiction over the person, available
156
in the state court at the time of removal.
Evidence-Presumptions and Burden of Proof: Section 810 of the
National Life Insurance Act provides that where an individual is
shown to have been absent without explanation "for seven years his
death as of the date of the expiration such period may . . . be considered as sufficiently proved.' 15 7 The cases frequently talk of presumptions in this connection, but it is almost too obvious for comment
that this provision merely authorizes an inference that the death
occurred on the last day of the period, the day which as a matter of
logical reasoning from experience is most unlikely. Consequently,
as was held in Peak v. United States,158 death at an earlier date may be
proved by circumstantial evidence. This would, of course, be true had
the statute created a presumption.
Same-Illegally obtained: In Flanders v. United States'5 9 the
155. Mengel Co. v. Nashville Paper Products & Specialty Workers Union,

221 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1955).

156.
1955).
157.
158.
159.

Munsey v. Testworthy Laboratories, Inc., 227 F.2d 902
54 STAT. 1013 (1940), 38 U.S.C.A. § 810 (1946).
229 F.2d 503 (6th Cir. 1956).
222 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1955).
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court considered all previous cases dealing with the question whether
using an extension telephone with the consent of the receiver' of
the message is an illegal interception forbidden by the Communications Act. It found the opinion of Judge Learned Hand of the Second
Circuit in United States v. Polakoff unacceptable, and held admissible
evidence of the message as heard on the extension telephone. Notwithstanding the generally recognized eminence of Judge Hand, it
is difficult to follow his reasoning in the Polakoff case, regardless of
one's views of the ethics of receiver's conduct.
Same-Parol Evidence Rule: Where the parties enter into an oral
agreement and proceed with its performance, and thereafter one of
them signs a later created writing purporting to embody the agreement, the parol evidence rule is not applicable to prevent him from
showing the terms of the oral agreement. And this is particularly
true where he signed the writing under circumstances indicating
duress. 160 It seems clear that the objectives of the rule, to assure
stability of commercial transactions, and prevent sharp dealing by
the party to whom the contract has proved disadvantageous, would be
frustrated rather than furthered by its application in such a situation.
Same-Opinion: The reception of an opinion of a witness, assumed
to be qualified as an expert, is reversible error when the opinion is
based on an assumption of fact contrary to the undisputed evidence. 161
This result is so unquestionable that one has to speculate as to why
the trial judge should have admitted the evidence.
WITNESSES
Competency-Mental Capacity: Where a witness appeared normal
and defendant's counsel merely requested that the court examine
him so as to determine his sanity but made no offer of evidence, the
162
court committed no error in permitting the witness to testify.
When the competency of a witness is challenged, it is usually the
function of the judge to conduct the examination or to be present
while counsel examines. This statement is dictum, and its application
must depend on the circumstances of the case. It is certainly the
function of counsel to make the challenge and to support it by
evidence when the appearance or conduct, or both, of the witness do
not make the incompetence obvious.
Same-Cross-examination: In a condemnation proceeding where
the hearing is before'a commission the adversary is entitled to crossexamine witnesses who have testified to the amount of compensation
to be awarded; and it is serious error for the commission to prevent
160. John A. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 229 F.2d 713 (6th Cir.
1955).
161. Louisville &N.R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955).
162. Henderson v. United States, 218 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1955).
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cross-examination as to the particular items involved in that amount.
Where such an error occurs and the award is confirmed by the district
judge, a reversal is required. 163 While the trial tribunal has a large
discretion in regulating the scope of cross-examination, its discretion
does not cover denial of all cross-examination on so important an issue.
TRIAL
Motions during Trial-Dismissal without Prejudice: The Tennessee state practice permits a plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice
at any time before the jury retires. This does not obtain in the United
States district court, where rule 41 (a) (2) governs. A district court
judge may make an order dismissing without prejudice conditioned
upon plaintiff's payment of expenses incurred to date and upon his
compliance with an already served notice to take his deposition. On
his failure to comply the judge may properly order and have entered
a judgment of dismissal with prejudice. 64
Jurors-Competency-Challenge: A person is not incompetent
to sit upon a jury trying accused on a charge of having received
stolen goods, merely because he had been a member of the jury
which tried accused's co-indictee for stealing, where it appears that
there was no evidence at the prior trial of the receipt by another of
the goods which had been stolen by the co-indictee. Furthermore,
accused had interposed no challenge to the juror, and it is immaterial
that accused's counsel was under the erroneous impression that the
trial judge, after some preliminary questioning of the juror, had
ruled him competent. 165 Counsel cannot, it seems, be too often
warned of the necessity of having the record show what he understands to have been the ruling of the court.
Charge to Jury: The court has been called upon to reaffirm the
generally accepted rules governing objections to the accuracy or sufficiency of the judge's instructions to the jury. A correctly phrased
request to charge is properly denied if the matter is adequately covered in the general charge, which must be considered as a whole and not
in isolated parts. A request which is not strictly accurate is properly
disregarded. 166 But instructions which are inconsistent on a material
point, or which in a criminal case ignore a defense supported by evidence, or which assume as proved a fact not established by the evi67
dence, constitute reversible error.
Same-Exceptions to Charge:Under rule 51 exceptions to the charge
163. United States v. 12.3 Acres of Land, 229 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1956).
164. Stern v. Inter-Mountain Telephone Co. 226 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1955).
165. Winer v. United States, 228 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1956).
166. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955); Lazarov
v. United States, 225 F.2d 319 (6th Cir. 1955); Southern Ry. v. Jones, 228 F.2d
203 (6th Cir. 1955).

167. Smith v. United States, 230 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956).
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not taken before the jury retires are ineffective and will be disregarded.168 But the rule is satisfied if by argument of counsel and
colloquy with the judge, the objections are made clear, 169 or if the
court has informed counsel that no additional objection need be
interposed because proper notation had already been made.170
Verdict-Sufficiency: The United States courts apply to cases
tried in Tennessee the settled Tennessee rule concerning a general
verdict for the plaintiff where the declaration contains several counts.
If one count is good and the evidence justifies a verdict for plaintiff
upon that count, a general verdict for plaintiff is good and judgment
is properly entered thereon. 171
NEW TRiAL

Grounds for-Misconduct of Counsel: In Henderson v. United
States 72 the majority of the court, speaking in general terms as to
permissible partisanship and vigor in the prosecutor's address to the
jury, refused to characterize his conduct as reversible misconduct.
Judge McAlister, dissenting, quoted portions of counsel's speech in
which he emphasized his own firm belief in the guilt of accused and
asserted his unwillingness ever to prosecute unless he was convinced
of defendant's guilt. Unless the usual assertions concerning the
obligation of counsel to refrain from injecting his personal opinion
upon vital issues are mere pious exhortations, it is difficult to disagree with Judge McAlister's dissent.
Same-PrejudicialPublicity: In Briggs v. United States17 3 the trial
judge during the trial issued bench warrants charging several witnesses with perjury who had given testimony contrary to statements
previously made to F.B.I. agents. This was given much publicity in
local newspapers access to which the jurors had, for they were permitted to separate during each recess. When defendant's counsel
moved for a mistrial, the judge suggested that counsel question the
jurors as to whether they had read, and been influenced by reading,
the published accounts; counsel rejected the suggestion. On appeal,
after denial of a motion for a new trial, the court held that the judge,
rather than counsel, should have taken steps to ascertain what effect
the publication had, and reversed the judgment of conviction.
Same-PrejudicialConduct of Judge: At the opening of the trial
the accused requested that counsel, who had been appointed by the
judge, be withdrawn. The judge in the presence of the panel from
which the petty jurors were to be drawn stated that the appointee was
168. Southern Ry. v. Jones, 228 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1955).

169.
170.
171.
172.

Louisville & N.R.R. v. Farmer, 220 F.2d 90 (6th Cir. 1955).
Knoxville v. Bailey, 222 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1955).

Ibid.
218 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1955).

173. 221 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1955).
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one of the best, a former United States attorney, that he would represent accused in every honorable way and would refuse to represent
him in a dishonorable way, if accused wanted such representation; and
that the appointee knew -nuch more about a lawsuit than accused,
though the accused may have had some experience. The court, on
appeal after conviction, held that the statement was highly prejudicial,
carrying an implication that accused had previously been a defendant,
and that, since the case was a close one on the evidence, the judgment
must be reversed. 174
Same-Receipt of Perjured Testimony: A witness gave highly
prejudicial testimony against accused. On recall he recanted and
confessed that it was entirely false. Thereupon the judge ordered
the original testimony stricken but did not grant a mistrial. The
court on appeal held that it was impossible to eradicate the prejudicial
effect of the false testimony by striking it, and ordered a new trial. 175
APPEAL AND ERROR

What is Appealable-Order Granting New Trial: At common law
an order granting or refusing a new trial in a civil action was not
appealable and was not even subject to review on writ of error
from the judgment entered after disposition of the motion. The
motion and ruling were not part of the common law record nor
could they be embodied in a bill of exceptions. An order granting a new
trial makes no final disposition of the litigation and is almost universally said not to be appealable in the absence of statutory authorization. Nevertheless, in Turner v. United States,17 6 the court seems to
have entertained a motion for a new trial and to have been content
with treating the rule as to appealability as identical with the rule as
to reviewability, namely, that the judge's ruling will be reversed only
for abuse of discretion.
Same-Order Refusing to Vacate Sentence: An order refusing to
vacate sentence on the ground that the acts charged in the indictment
do not constitute a violation of the specified statute is not appealable.
This point could and should have been raised on appeal from the
177
judgment of conviction.
174. Chalupiak v. United States, 223 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1955).
175. Snipes v. United States, 230 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1956).
176. 229 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1956).

177. Fooshee v. United States, 223 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1955).

